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Thank you.    It is my pleasure to join this discussion. 
 
I happen to have served Japan’s financial regulatory authority for 
more than ten years until I stepped down as head of the authority last 
July.  This  means  that  I  experienced both the current global 
financial crisis and Japan’s last banking crisis in the late 1990s.    I 
had the privilege of dealing with a big financial crisis, not only once 
but  twice.  “What  a  lucky person I am!”    I sometimes feel like this 
somewhat  cynically.     
 
Anyway, the scale of the current crisis has often been characterized as 
“once-in-a-century” or “the most severe since the Great Depression.”  
Because I had such harsh experience, however, my feeling is that the 
current stress is rather a “second-in-a-decade" event.  
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Using this perspective, I would like to explain today the effects of the current 
global crisis on Japan’s financial sector and the authorities’ policy response.  
I will first describe the differences between the last crisis and the current 
turbulence in Japan in terms of their nature and magnitude.  Secondly, I will 
touch upon the possible reasons why Japan’s financial system has been 
less affected than the United States and Europe this time.  Then I will move 
on to describe the measures taken in Japan in response to the current 
financial stress, which somewhat differs from that in the United States and 
Europe.  Finally, I would like to raise a point with regard to the manner in 
which the world’s regulators should advance their reform agenda.     
 
1. Comparing  the  current stress in Japan with the last crisis 
 
There are divergent views as to how the effects of the current financial 
stress in Japan can be compared with the country’s last banking crisis in the 
1990s.  Some may argue that the magnitude of the last crisis was larger 
since many financial firms failed and the economy remained sluggish over 
an extended period.  Yet others may say that the current stress is more 
severe as Japan’s GDP and share prices have declined sharply. 
 
These divergent views probably reflect the fact that the current stress 
differs significantly from the difficulties we faced in the 1990s.    I 
think the following four can be pointed out as the main sources of the 3/11 
difference.    The first two of them are encouraging to us but the latter 
two make us rather pessimistic: 
 
¾  First, the market turbulence in Japan this time was triggered by 
an exogenous shock, whereas the root causes of the last crisis 
were located within the country.    The current financial stress in 
Japan stems mainly from the collapse of the housing and 
securitization markets in the United States, among others.    In 
contrast, the crisis in the 1990s was the result of an endogenous 
shock, since Japanese financial firms had been deeply involved 
in the creation of the bubble in the domestic property market.   
Accordingly, their exposure to problem loans was much greater 
in the 1990s.   
 
¾  Second, the regulatory framework and financial safety net have 
now been improved significantly in Japan.    In the early 1990s, 
we had in place neither sufficiently effective frameworks for 
disclosure or provisioning with respect to non-performing loans, 
nor sufficiently robust schemes for deposit protection and 
resolution of failed banks.    The lack of these frameworks 
provided incentives for banks to postpone the disposal of their 
non-performing loans, and for the authorities to avoid bank 
resolution in fear of its side effects.  Based  on  the  bitter 
experience that the lack of a reliable framework prolonged 4/11 
financial distress and the economic slump, we have improved 
disclosure requirements, clarified the rules on write-downs and 
provisioning, put in place a prompt corrective action scheme, 
and established an early warning system that enables the 
supervisors to conduct intense monitoring of banks before they 
become undercapitalized.    The deposit insurance and bank 
resolution schemes have also been strengthened, and a robust 
framework to deal with systemic risk has been put in place. 
 
¾  Third, the impact of the market turmoil in one country spilled over 
quickly to other countries this time, including Japan.    Since 
securitized products are traded on the markets, the current crisis has a 
strong cross-border character.  Risks were scattered to a wide range 
of investors through the use of what is called the “originate-to-distribute” 
business model, and the losses were dispersed globally.  The global 
turmoil also hit Japan’s financial sector through a sharp decline of 
share prices worldwide.  In comparison, the effect of Japan’s 
banking crisis in the 1990s was largely contained within the border.   
 
¾  The fourth point of difference is that the current market turmoil 
resulted in what is likely to become the deepest global recession 
since the Second World War.  In the late 1990s, the world 
economy sustained positive growth as a whole even in spite of Japan’s 
banking crisis, the Asian crisis, and the turbulence of the global markets 5/11 
that followed.  However, in the World Economic Outlook published 
earlier this month, the International Monetary Fund forecasts the 
World’s real GDP growth for 2009 as minus 1.1 percent.    The global 
recession has led to a serious weakening of Japan’s real 
economy through severe contraction of external demand.   
Japan’s GDP recorded a negative growth of 12.4 percent on an 
annualized basis in the first quarter of 2009, and is projected to 
record an annual growth of minus 5.4 percent in 2009.    The 
current global recession thus revealed vividly that Japan’s 
economy is heavily dependent on the export sector.        
 
2.  Why was Japan’s financial system less severely hit this time? 
 
As I have just explained, Japan was not immune from the current 
global financial crisis.    The financial system was severely affected 
by high volatility of the financial markets, including through a sharp 
decline in the prices of shares held by banks.  Meanwhile,  the 
deterioration of the real economy impacted banks’ profitability in the 
form of increased credit costs, albeit on a limited scale.   
 
Nevertheless, one can fairly say that Japan’s financial system itself 
remains relatively sound compared with those in the United States 
and Europe.    This recognition derives from the fact that the losses 
Japan’s financial banking sector incurred from complex securitized 6/11 
products have been limited; as of end-June 2009, the cumulative 
realized losses since April 2007 are about 25 billion US dollars, and 
the valuation losses are about 5 billion dollars.  These  figures  are 
one digit smaller than those of the American and European financial 
sectors.  The  exposure of Japan’s financial sector to opaque, toxic 
assets is also significantly smaller.    This implies that future 
additional losses from these assets will be limited as well.   
 
Then, why was Japan’s financial system less exposed to the market 
turmoil and less severely affected in the current global crisis?   
There are a few anecdotes that indicate some possible reasons for 
this relative soundness. 
 
¾  First, it is alleged that the soundness is simply a result of the fact 
that Japan’s financial firms were not strongly 
innovation-oriented. 
¾  Second, it is probably because of a historical coincidence that 
the firms were giving priority to improving their financial 
soundness rather than enhancing their profitability in the last 
several  years.  When  the  “originate-to-distribute” business 
model became widespread, it happened that Japan’s financial 
firms were at the final stage of resolving the non-performing loan 
problems. 
¾  Third and finally, some observers point out that the risk 7/11 
management practices of Japan’s financial firms were improving 
in the course of the period I just mentioned.    Firms became 
more cautious than before about investing in financial products 
with uncertainty on their underlying assets or associated risks.   
Early implementation of the Basel II framework in Japan has also 
contributed to ensuring these practices. 
 
I think there is some truth in every anecdote but, being a former 
financial regulator, I am naturally most attracted to the third possible 
reason.  
 
3.  Stabilization  measures taken in Japan   
 
Let me now move on to describe the short-term stabilization 
measures taken in Japan in response to the current market turmoil.   
As I mentioned earlier, the features of these measures seem to differ 
considerably between Japan on the one hand, and the U.S. and 
Europe on the other. 
 
The U.S. and European authorities have taken a number of 
extraordinary actions to stabilize the financial system.    They include 
large-scale capital injection with public funds, temporary bank 
nationalization, and bank debt guarantees by governments, as well 
as massive liquidity provisioning by central banks.    Meanwhile, few 8/11 
of these extreme actions have been taken in Japan in response to 
the current turmoil.     
 
This difference reflects the fact that the shock Japan has suffered in 
the current turmoil is exogenous.    In other words, Japan’s financial 
system suffered from external injury but not from a disease of 
internal organs.    Therefore, most of the short-term policies in Japan 
are aimed at preventing the external injury from turning into a serious 
internal disease.    More specifically, the measures we took can be 
classified into three types. 
 
¾  The first type is the measures to preserve the soundness of the 
financial sector.  For  instance,  
z We  conducted  stress  tests with financial firms on a regular 
basis to make sure that the financial sector maintains its 
soundness as a whole. 
z  We also did our best to identify as soon as possible the 
potential spillover effects of overseas events, such as the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers and the public intervention into 
AIG (American International Group).     
z  Based on these efforts, we expressed concerns to the 
financial firms that could be impacted significantly, and 
urged them to take remedial actions as necessary. 
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¾  The second type of measures is aimed at maintaining the 
functioning of the financial markets.  For  example, 
z  We banned naked short selling of shares and enhanced 
disclosure on short selling.    The objectives of these 
measures were not to keep a specific level of share prices, 
but to avoid extreme price volatility and to support the 
pricing function of the markets. 
z  Also, in response to the market turmoil that followed the 
Lehman’s collapse, we, the Financial Services Agency, 
coordinated with the Bank of Japan and relevant 
government agencies with respect to government or central 
bank purchases of qualified commercial paper and bonds in 
an effort to provide liquidity. 
 
¾  The third type of measures is focused on sustaining bank lending 
in order to support activities in the real economy.    They include: 
z  Providing the capital injection scheme, which can be used 
by banks on their own business judgment to maintain a 
sufficient capital base and sustain their lending; and 
z Intensive  supervisory  review  of banks’ lending practices to 
ensure that their financial intermediary functions work 
properly. 
 
4.    Right balance between crisis management and reform 10/11 
 
In parallel with these short-term measures, the world’s financial 
regulators are advancing medium-term reforms to strengthen 
financial  regulation.  Discussions are underway globally regarding 
the capital adequacy of banks, procyclicality in the financial system, 
market integrity and transparency, and international cooperation 
among regulators.    Here, I would like to emphasize that the right 
balance needs to be struck in implementing short-term stabilization 
measures and medium-term regulatory reforms. 
 
On the one hand, crisis management measures should not remain in place 
over a prolonged period as some of them include exceptional actions with 
large-scale public support.  Such a situation could cause moral hazard in 
the marketplace or distort the system in the longer run.  On the other hand, 
too hasty implementation of medium-term measures could rather 
exacerbate the situation and impede economic recovery.  This  is  the 
reason why the Pittsburgh G20 Statement has made it clear that the 
rules to improve bank capital “will be phased in as financial 
conditions improve and economic recovery is assured.”     
 
The implementation of regulatory reform needs to be well timed and 
carefully sequenced.    Financial regulators should be reminded that 
tightening regulation is not a goal in itself: it is rather a means to 
ensure that the financial system plays its indispensable role of 11/11 
supporting the broader  economy.   
 
Thank you. 
 